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Abstract
In this paper, we show substantial empirical evidence that house prices are more sensitive to shocks to per-
capita income, in countries where housing finance is more developed. This result is consistent with the
theoretical framework developed in the paper, where we study the impact of progressive relaxation of
financial constraints on housing demand and equilibrium house prices. Our results are consistent with recent
literature on financial constraints and business investment, which argues that the investment of less
constrained firms can be more sensitive to changes in cash flow. More broadly, our results challenge the
traditional view that financial development leads to smaller fluctuations in key economic variables. From a
policy perspective, our paper suggests that even if financial development is desirable for other reasons, the
associated increase in the extent of fluctuations should be an explicit policy concern.
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21 Introduction
There is a large literature about the impact of financial constraints on economic
fluctuations. Most of this literature argues that tighter financial constraints should lead to
amplified fluctuations. For example, the investment-cash flow literature started with
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), argues that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow
is higher for firms which are more financially constrained. In an international context,
Japelli and Pagano (1989) show that consumption on non-durables is more sensitive to
disposable income fluctuations in countries where consumers are more financially
constrained. In the context of the housing literature, Lamont and Stein (1999) show that in
US city-years when households have higher observed leverage, house prices are more
sensitive to changes in per-capita income. They interpret this result as being caused by
down-payment requirements (which can generate credit constraints on households).
The fluctuations in economic variables induced by financial constraints are usually
interpreted as being "excessive", in the sense that they are higher than what would obtain in
an economy of perfect credit markets. The results above suggest that, as financial markets
become more developed, we should expect an welfare improving decrease in the degree of
fluctuations in key economic variables. The policy implications are natural. Policies which
are directed at the relaxation of credit constraints for firms and households should reduce
the extent of fluctuations in variables such as consumption, investment and prices.
In this paper, we will argue that financial development may well lead to amplified
fluctuations, in the context of the housing market. This is in stark contrast with the
established view about the role of financial constraints which exists in the literature. The
implication of our results is that higher fluctuations may be an undesirable consequence of
the process of financial development. From a policy perspective, our results suggest that
even if financial development has other economic benefits1, it is desirable to devise policies
to minimize the potential side effects on the extent of fluctuations.
Let us describe in greater detail what we do in the paper. We study the behavior of
house prices for a large panel of countries. Housing finance development differs
                                                
1 There are indeed plenty of evidence that financial development has positive effects on the economy as a
whole. See Levine (1997) for a survey.
3substantially across the world. This allows us to sort countries according to their degree of
housing finance development. In countries with less developed housing finance, households
will be more financially constrained, in the sense that they will be able to borrow less, in
order to finance housing and other consumption and investment items. Take a country with
low housing finance development (Italy, for example). In such a country, maximum loan-
to-value (LTV) ratios rarely exceed 60%, and the stock of outstanding mortgage debt is
typically lower than 20% of GDP2. On the other hand, in a country with high financial
development (such as Denmark), maximum LTV ratios approach 90%, and the stock of
mortgage debt is usually more than 50% of GDP.
The effect of such differences in financial development on house price behavior is
considered from a theoretical perspective in section 2. We build a simple model (which
draws heavily on Stein, 1995, and Almeida, 2000), to show the following: Although it is
true that the presence of financial constraints tend to lead to an excess sensitivity in house
prices, it is not true that this sensitivity decreases as households become (progressively) less
financially constrained. Indeed, the opposite tends to occur in the model. Consider the
example of Denmark and Italy given above. If the degree of financial development in
Denmark is not so high that households become financially unconstrained (that is, down-
payment requirements are no longer binding), then the model suggests that house prices
should be more sensitive to shocks to household income in Denmark than in Italy.
The intuition for this result is simple. If income increases, for example, the value of
housing will go up. As long as households can borrow a positive fraction of the value of the
houses, the increase in income will also allow the household to borrow more, given the
increase in the value of housing, and the fact that borrowing capacity is increasing in the
value of housing. Furthermore, if households can borrow a higher fraction of the value of
houses, the second effect increases. In other words, the higher is the level of financial
development, the higher is the feedback effect from an increase in the value of houses to
credit, so financial development will contribute to increase the sensitivity of demand to
income, and therefore will also increase the sensitivity of prices to changes in income.
In our view, the reason why the literature has in general not considered the
                                                
2 We also consider other objective and subjective criteria to sort countries according to levels of housing
finance development. See section 4.
4possibility that relaxation of financial constraints amplify fluctuations is very simple3.
Previous work focused on the difference between constrained to unconstrained agents. Yet,
it is more plausible that all agents are constrained to some extent4, and we should compare
constrained agents according to the degree of financial constraints. This is at the heart of
the argument above, which implies that countries with more developed financial markets
may have more volatile housing markets.
In order to test this prediction, we look at the sensitivity of house prices to changes
in per-capita income across the world, using a panel of countries. We show substantial
evidence that house prices are more sensitive to shocks to per-capita income, in countries
where housing finance is more developed. Our estimates imply that in a country with low
financial development like Italy, in the first year following a positive 1% shock to per-
capita income, house prices go up by around 0.5%. On the other hand, in a country with
high financial development like Denmark, house prices go up by more than 1% in the first
year. These differences are persistent through time. After 4 years, the cumulative price
changes are around 1% and 2%, respectively. The differences are statistically significant,
and are also large from an economic point of view.
We submit the house price data to a number of robustness checks and alternative
estimation techniques. The result described above is for our benchmark specification,
where we introduce our measures of financial development in the house price regressions
interacting with all the coefficients5. The same result holds when we split the sample
according to the measures of financial development, or when we use a two-stage approach
with separate house price regressions for each country (and a cross-section regression to
explain the variation in coefficients). We also show that the result above is not driven by
influential outliers.
We submit the data to a number of alternative explanations for the basic result that
financial development increases the sensitivity of prices to income.
It could be the case that high income countries have higher sensitivities, simply
                                                
3 Almeida (2000), Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 1999), and Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1999) are
exceptions.
4 This is especially likely to be the case in developing countries.
5 This benchmark specification is the same as in Lamont and Stein (1999), which form the basis for our
empirical work.
5because house markets are more liquid in such countries, and not because of financing
differences. Also, it could be that house price indices are better measured in high income
countries, and since income is correlated with financial development, our result could be
driven only by attenuation bias. However, cross-country differences in percapita income are
shown to perform very poorly as a potential explanation for our result. Thus, the differences
in sensitivities that we document are not due to differences in the overall level of economic
development across countries.
Our measures of financial development reflects observed measures of leverage,
since it uses information on observed household debt. This is true even for the data on
maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios available in each country. While some of the LTV
data refers to regulatory constraints on mortgages, for some countries the data on maximum
LTV ratios are constructed from observed values.
This raises the concern that our measures do not precisely capture the availability of
finance to households. Perhaps household debt is low because households choose not to
borrow (the usual identification problem). Furthermore, high leverage has been used in the
literature as an indication of tighter financial constraints6.
We address these endogeneity problems by instrumenting our measures of housing
finance development with accounting standards, which have been used in the literature as a
measure of the availability of finance to firms. Under the assumption that the same
underlying forces drive the availability of finance to firms and households7, this is an
appropriate instrument. All the results hold for the instrumental variable regressions. This is
strong evidence that our result is indeed driven by differences in the availability of finance
to households.
These results are related to several strands of recent finance and macroeconomics
literature.
In the context of the investment literature. Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Cleary
(1999) claim that, in their particular samples, the investment of less constrained firms is in
fact more sensitive to changes in cash flow, in contrast to the traditional view pioneered by
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). This is clearly consistent with the results in this
                                                
6 See Whited (1992), for an example.
7 The correlation between accounting standards and maximum LTV ratios in the data is 0.54.
6paper. In terms of the theoretical literature, Almeida (2000) uncovers specific
circumstances under which less financial constraints could lead to more fluctuations in
business investment and prices of capital goods. This is especially likely to happen, as he
shows, when agents are credit-constrained, and borrowing capacity depends on the
collateralizable value of the assets invested. One example of such a situation is on housing
finance contracts. The results in Almeida (2000) therefore also suggest that, as households
become less financially constrained, the demand for housing (and consequently house
prices) should become more sensitive to shocks to current income.
The results in this paper are related to those obtained in Lamont and Stein (1999).
They compare house price dynamics in different cities in the US, sorted by observed
leverage ratios for households, and find that high observed leverage in a US city-year
increases sensitivity to per-capita income shocks in that city-year. However, there are
important differences in the applicability and interpretation of their results and ours.
As we argue above, the results in this paper provide evidence that tighter financial
constraints can actually lead to smaller fluctuations in investment and prices. On the other
hand, it would be problematic to interpret the evidence in Lamont and Stein (1999) in the
same way. Indeed, the authors never pursue this direction of interpretation. A possible
interpretation of the Lamont and Stein results is that household leverage is driven by
changes in house prices. Homeowners have high leverage in a given city-year because
house prices are low, and not because it is easier to borrow in that city. If this is the case,
then city-year observed leverage cannot be interpreted as a measure of the degree of credit
constraints on households.
The advantage of our approach is that housing finance development is less
controversial, as a measure of the ability of households to borrow. It is very hard to argue
that homeowners are more financially constrained in the UK than in Israel or Thailand.
On the other hand, even if observed leverage does reflect differences in the ability
to borrow across US cities8, there is a clear advantage in looking at international data. Since
housing finance systems differ much more across different countries in the world than
                                                
8 This interpretation seems hard to reconcile with some of the Lamont and Stein results. They instrument
leverage with state-level homestead exemptions. This is based on the Gropp, Scholz and White (1997)
argument that in states with generous exemptions, households could have easier access to mortgages.
However, none of the coefficients on instrumented leverage are significant.
7across US states, it is much easier to capture the effect of different laws and institutions,
which affect the availability of housing finance. Indeed, our scheme to classify countries
(described in section 4) is an attempt to summarize different quantitative and qualitative
criteria into measures of the development of housing finance systems across the world.
Our empirical approach also borrows from Japelli and Pagano (1989, 1994). They
use data on liquidity constraints on households in order to study the relationship between
financial development and several macroeconomic variables, such as savings, growth and
the sensitivity of the consumption of non-durables to changes in current income. Our results
are both consistent with, and different than theirs. They find (in the 1994 paper) that tighter
liquidity constraints on households can increase savings and the growth rate of a country.
Therefore, financial development (or financial deregulation) does not necessarily lead to
better outcomes, which is consistent with the result we obtain in this paper. On the other
hand, Japelli and Pagano find in their 1989 paper that the sensitivity of consumption of
non-durables to current income is higher in countries where households are more
financially constrained. This is at odds with our conclusion about the relative sensitivity of
house prices and housing demand across countries.
This paper also contributes to the literature on housing markets itself. Almost all
evidence on house price dynamics comes from studies of specific countries. Englund and
Ioannides (1997) are an exception. They characterize house price dynamics for a cross-
section of 15 OECD countries. However, they do not focus on the impact of financial
constraints on dynamics. Malpezzi (1990) and Malpezzi and Mayo (1997b) discuss some
possible interactions between financial development and housing markets, but do not focus
on price dynamics.
Finally, our results are intimately related to previous attempts to evaluate the
relationship between financial market liberalization and house price volatility9. The general
theme in that literature is that, within the OECD countries, those with more liberal financial
markets experienced higher house price volatility during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Our
evidence adds to this literature in the following ways. We make a rigorous attempt to
classify countries according to their degree of housing finance development. We
also consider a larger cross section of countries, which includes developing countries and
8other non-OECD countries. We perform formal econometric analysis of the effects of
financial development on the housing market, which are absent from previous work. We
also focus on a different object. While the previous literature focuses on house price
volatility, we emphasize the sensitivity of prices to income shocks.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 considers the theoretical reasons why financial
constraints could affect house price behavior, in the context of a simple model. Section 3
describes our data on house prices and per-capita GDP. Section 4 gives a detailed summary
of how we construct measures of housing finance development. Section 5 contains the main
empirical results, and some robustness checks. Section 6 presents more evidence that the
results are indeed driven by the availability of finance. Section 7 concludes
                                                                                                                                                    
9 See Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994), Muellbauer at al. (1998), Renaud (1995) and Stephens (1995).
92. A simple model of the effects of financial development on
house price behavior
Consider the following scenario, which is adapted from Stein (1995) and Almeida
(2000).
There are two goods, housing (H), and food (Z). The price of housing (P) is
measured in units of food. The individual is initially endowed with H0 units of housing, and
a given amount of outstanding debt D0  raised in the past against the house10. There are two
time periods. At time t1 the individual chooses how many units of housing he will buy or
sell11 (H1). The amount spent on the house must be lower than the individual's total wealth
at time t1. Besides the value of the housing endowment, the individual has income equal to
W1, and he can raise mortgage debt against the value of his new house. We will assume
throughout that the riskless rate of interest in this economy is equal to 1. The maximum
amount that a household can borrow is assumed to be equal to a fraction of the value of the
house, that is:
(1) 11 )1( PHB τ−=
As in Almeida (2000), B1 can be seen as the fraction of the liquidation value of
houses which can be recovered by creditors. The parameter τ measures the degree of
financial development. The lower the τ, the easier it is for a household to borrow in order to
finance the purchase of the house. If τ=0  in particular, we know the household will be
financially unconstrained.
                                                
10 That is, households are repeat buyers. See Stein (1995) for a discussion about this hypothesis. It is worth
noting here that in a country like the US, 60% of all home sales are to repeat buyers. In any case, as we will
see below, the assumption that households are repeat buyers is not necessary for all the results. In particular,
the result that the sensitivity of prices to income is increasing in financial development does not depend on
repeat sales.
11 This assumes no rental market for houses. See Stein (1995) for a discussion of this assumption. In
particular, notice that this assumption is excessively strong. All that is needed is that renting entails some
extra costs (such as those related to moral hazard problems) in comparison with home ownership.
10
 In terms of the real world, the parameter depends on variables such as the costs of
enforcing and disposing of collateral, regulations about housing finance and the amount of
information creditors have about borrowers12.
The parameter τ can also be seen as a measure of the degree of rationing faced by
households in the mortgage market. Another possible approach would be to focus on the
relative cost of funds, or more specifically, on the wedge between the borrowing rate in the
mortgage market, and an appropriate lending rate. However, as discussed by Japelli and
Pagano (1989), this wedge does not appear to be a viable explanation of the cross-country
differences in the financial liabilities of households. Differences among the interest rate
wedges seem negligible, and there is no clear relation between lending volumes and
wedges. Consistent with our approach, Japelli and Pagano (1989, 1994) also focus on cross-
sectional differences in liquidity constraints on households13.
Given this set up, the budget constraint of a household in period t1 is:
(2)        )1( 01101 DWPHPHPH −+−+≤ τ
At time t2 the household derives utility from H1, and also from the other good,
according to:
(3)        )ln()1()ln(),( 11 ZHZHU αα −+=
The household earns income also in period t2. If there are any savings left over from
the previous period, the household saves it until the final period. He must also repay the
debt raised in the previous period. Therefore, his budget constraint in t2  is:
(4)  })1({)1( 1101012 PHPHDWPHPHWZ −−+−++−−≤ ττ
                                                
12 See Japelli and Pagano (1994) for a more detailed discussion. Stein (1995) and Spiegel (1999) endogeneize
down payment requirements using models based on moral hazard and adverse selection issues.
13 Nevertheless, the focus of their analysis is different. They examine the sensitivity of consumption of non-
durables to current income.
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The term in curly brackets is the excess savings left over from the previous period.
If a household is unconstrained, then the period t1 constraint is never binding, and the
household chooses the optimal amounts of housing according to:
(5)                   )( 00211 P
DPHWWPH U −++=α
In order to determine the equilibrium price of housing, we assume that the supply of
housing in period t1 is fixed at Hs = 1.
Therefore, the equilibrium condition yields the unconstrained equilibrium price as:
(6)                    )(
1
)( 021
0
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H
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−
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τ
We will assume throughout that W2 = D0, so that households have enough income at
the final date to repay the original amount of debt they were endowed with.
Consider now the constrained household problem. Our solution method is the
following. First, we assume that the constraint (2) binds, and derive the optimal housing
demand of a constrained agent. Then, we use the market equilibrium condition to get the
constrained equilibrium price, P*(τ). Given this price, we must make sure that the
individual is indeed constrained. The condition for this is that the unconstrained demand at
the constrained equilibrium price violates the budget constraint (2), that is:
(7)             1)]([)]([ **1
*
1 => ττ PHPH
U
Let us do that. Assuming that (2) binds, we get:
(8)
P
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PH
τ
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Therefore, the equilibrium constrained price function is:
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Using equations (5) to (8), we can show that this is a feasible equilibrium as long as:
(10)         
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Intuitively, if the level of financial development is high enough, such that the
parameter τ  goes below a certain level, households will always be unconstrained. Given
this, we can write the price function generally as:
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0
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The two values are equal at  τ =τmin, so the price function is continuous inτ.
Furthermore, it is clear that P(τ ) is decreasing in τ . This has a straightforward
interpretation. Relaxation of financial constraints increase housing demand, and given our
assumption of fixed supply, should increase house prices in equilibrium.
The function P(τ) will have two other properties which are crucial for my purposes.
As long as D0 >0, there will be a range of τ for which the effects of a change in household
income (an increase in W1 ), will have an amplified effect on house prices if households are
constrained. In other words, ∂ P/∂ W1 will be higher if agents are constrained. According to
the definition in Stein (1995), there is a multiplier effect in operation in the model.
Furthermore, the sensitivity of house prices to changes in income will be increasing
in financial development (decreasing in τ ), as long as households are financially
constrained (τ  greater than τ min). This is the key hypothesis that we attempt to test using
our international data on house prices. Let us derive and interpret these results.
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Proposition 1
Let D0 >0, and define τmax =H0+  (1-α H0) /α. Then, if τmin ≤ τ ≤τmax, prices will be more
sensitive to changes in income than in the situation where τ ≤ τmin. In words, prices will be
more sensitive to changes in income if households are financially constrained.
Proof: First notice that D0 >0 implies that τmin < τmax, so the range above is well defined.
Using equation (11):
(12)               if     
1 min01
ττ
α
α
≤
−
=
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∂
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P
This is the sensitivity of prices to income if households are financially
unconstrained. If households are constrained we get:
(13)               if     1 min
01
ττ
τ
≥
−
=
∂
∂
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P
The expression in (13) is larger than that in (12), as long as τ ≤τmax.
Proposition 2
The sensitivity of prices to changes in income is decreasing in τ  if τ  ≥ τmin. In words, as
long as households are financially constrained, the sensitivity of prices to income increases
with financial development.
Proof: As long as τ  ≥ τmin, the sensitivity of prices to income is given by equation
(13). It is easy to see that increases in τ decrease this sensitivity. If τ decreases so much that
households become unconstrained, the sensitivity jumps to the value in equation (12),
which is lower than the value in equation (13) by proposition (1).
This means that, as long as the level of financial development is not so high that
households are effectively unconstrained, the sensitivity of prices to income should be
higher in situations where households can borrow a higher fraction of the value of their
14
homes.
 Figure 1 depicts the sensitivity of prices to income, as a function of τ. It illustrates
well our main result. If we compare economies where households are unconstrained, with
economies where households are constrained, we get the traditional result that financial
constraints increase the sensitivity to shocks that affect net worth. In our model, this is true
at least for τ  ≤ τmax. However, if we compare two economies which differ according to the
degree of financial constraints, it is always the case that less financial constraints mean
higher sensitivity to changes in income.
The interpretation of this increase in sensitivity depends on whether we have τ  <
τmax or not. In the first case, the sensitivity of prices to income is excessive, in the sense that
it is higher than in an unconstrained economy. Further decreases in τ in this range make the
economy depart even more from its unconstrained behavior. On the other hand, if τ > τmax,
the increase in sensitivity is only moving the economy closer to its unconstrained solution.
In order to understand these results, it is useful to consider the sensitivity of demand
to changes in income, both in the constrained and unconstrained cases. We have:
(14)
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It is clear from these equations that the sensitivity is higher in the constrained
economy, since both α and τ are lower than one. There are two reasons for this. In the
unconstrained economy, an increase in income generates an income effect, which tends to
increase demand for houses. However, part of the income effect goes to the other good,
which is also normal (if α<1). On the other hand, in the constrained economy all the
increase in income is   channeled to housing, since the demand for houses is lower than the
unconstrained optimum. In words, financial constraints amplify the income effect of the
demand for houses. The second effect is related to credit. As long as τ < 1, the increase in
income will also allow the household to borrow more, given the increase in the value of
housing, and the fact that borrowing capacity is increasing in the value of housing. These
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two effects make demand more sensitive to income if households are financially
constrained.
Furthermore, the lower the τ  the higher is the second effect in the constrained
economy. This is why the sensitivity is always increasing in τ (if τ > τmin). In words, the
higher is the level of financial development, the higher is the feedback effect from an
increase in the value of houses to credit, so financial development will contribute to
increase the sensitivity of demand to income, and therefore will also increase the sensitivity
of prices to changes in income.
Proposition 1 also argues that the sensitivity of equilibrium prices in the constrained
economy can be actually lower than in the unconstrained case, if τ  is high enough (τ >
τmax). This happens because of the effect of τ  in the intercept of the function H1*(P). We
can write:
(15)
P
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The elasticity of demand with respect to prices is higher if the intercept is lower.
Therefore, a given increase in prices will have a higher effect on demand if the parameter τ
is higher. A smaller increase in prices is required to balance demand and supply, if τ is
higher. Therefore, even though the sensitivity of demand to income is higher for given
prices in a constrained economy, the impact on equilibrium prices can be lower if τ is high
enough.
We now turn to the empirical analysis. The model above suggests that house prices
should be more sensitive to changes in household income, if households can borrow a
higher fraction of the value of their homes. In other words, as households become
progressively less financially constrained, house prices should become more sensitive to
changes in household income. Thus, if we compare two countries with different levels of
housing finance development, house prices should be more sensitive to income in the
country with higher financial development.
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3 Data Description
In this study, we use house price data for 29 countries, listed in table 2. Ideally, the
house price index for each country should have the following properties. First, it should
refer to residential property prices. It should be representative of the whole country, and of
a high enough percentage of the residential real estate transactions occurred in a given year.
It is also desirable that the index is adjusted for changes in the quality of the property
traded. Unfortunately, quality-adjusted nationwide indices only exist for a few countries,
such as some of the Scandinavian countries, and the UK. The quality of the indices we were
able to obtain, and the availability of time series data differ across different countries. We
list all our sources, and the information we have about the different indices in the appendix.
We were able to get data on most OECD countries for the period 1970-1998, and
therefore we chose this period as our benchmark period. Data for Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, UK and US come from Englund and Ioannides (1997), for the period 1970-1993.
These different indices are also reported on the Bank of International Settlements Annual
Reports. We were able to use these to update Englund and Ioannides data until 1998.
Besides these countries, we found data for Austria, Chile, Hong Kong, Israel,
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan and
Thailand. Not all countries have time series available for the whole benchmark period, but
this is less of a concern than the quality of the indices. It is not obvious that all of these
indices are of worse quality than many of the BIS indices, although this is probably true on
average. For example, the New Zealand data are representative of the country, and quality
adjusted. Since we will attempt to identify an effect that is related to the degree of the
development of housing finance in each country, it is very important to have data on
developing countries. Naturally, our results (even if obtained only with the BIS data) may
be subject to qualifications arising from the quality of the data. We try to address some of
these concerns in section 5.6.
We will also need data on per-capita GDP for each country, and indicators of
development of housing finance. We discuss the latter in detail in the next section. The
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GDP data comes from the IMF financial statistics. We summarize our data in table 1 below.
We use yearly changes in the logs of all variables. We deflate all our data using the
consumer price index, also from the IFS database.
Notice that there are some very extreme observations in our data, both for changes
in per-capita GDP and real house prices. The extreme GDP values are both for Israel. We
will later show that our results are not driven by such outliers. Table 2 gives a summary of
the house price data per country.
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4 Housing finance across the world
4.1 Measuring housing finance development
The theoretical arguments in section 2 suggest that financial constraints can play an
important role in shaping the behavior of house prices. The relevant empirical measure
should capture the extent to which households can access housing finance in different
countries.
Our most important empirical measure will be the maximum loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio that households can achieve in each country. This is an exogenous limit on the amount
that a household can borrow, in order to finance house purchases. The maximum  LTV
ratio is the direct empirical counterpart of the parameter (1-τ) in the model of section 2.
Japelli and Pagano (1989, 1994) also use maximum LTV ratios as a measure of the
availability of credit to households, in an international context. As they argue, LTV ratios
are a direct measure of liquidity constraints on households. They argue that such measures
of liquidity constraints do a better job of explaining the large cross-sectional differences in
consumer debt than variables related to the demand for credit (such as taxes, age structure
and earning profiles), or than the wedge between borrowing and lending rates.
We collected substantial data on LTV ratios and household debt for the countries in
our sample. LTV ratios were available from different sources, but the best cross-section for
our purposes comes from Japelli and Pagano (1994). Since there can be concerns about the
comparability of the data from different sources, we take LTV ratios from Japelli and
Pagano whenever they are available for a country in our sample. The values reported in
table 3 below are the raw averages of their data for 1971-1980, and 1980-1987. We
augment their data with data for Austria, Canada and Singapore, taken respectively from
Deutsch (1997), Guiso, Japelli and Terlizzese (1994), and Phang and Wong (1994). Our
other sources for LTV ratios report values that are consistent with the data on table 3.
It is interesting to notice the substantial variations in LTV ratios across the world. It
does seem to be true that developing countries have lower LTV ratios. It is only 30% in
Korea, and 40% in Taiwan. The highest values are generally for Anglo-Saxon and
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Scandinavian countries, besides Singapore (85%).
We complement the LTV data with other quantitative and qualitative criteria, which
we explain below. The purpose of this is two-fold. First of all, these criteria can be used as
a verification of the usefulness of the LTV ratio as a measure of financial constraints on
households. Furthermore, to the extent that the LTV ratios are not a precise measure of the
degree of financial constraints on households14, these other criteria can add information.
With this motivation, the second quantitative variable we actually use is the actual
amount of debt households have in each country, scaled by national income or GDP. This
allows to check whether it is the case that high LTV ratios are indeed associated with high
debt levels in the different countries.
The data on household debt was more erratic. There are many different sources, but
few of them have data on a wide enough cross section of countries. The definitions of
household debt also differed widely. The widest cross-section is again in Japelli and Pagano
(1994), but they consider total consumer credit, and not only mortgage debt. There are
many other sources with data on mortgage debt, but often for a small cross section of
countries. Our strategy here was to build an index that takes into account the information
from the different sources, even when the data were not directly comparable across sources.
The data we used is reported fully in the appendix. For example, if a country is
systematically classified among the ones with high household debt, we assign it a value of
one. Similar considerations are true for our definitions of average and low household debt.
If there was any doubt about how to classify a particular country, we assigned it a “NA”.
There are also other variables that help identifying financial constraints, which are
used in the literature about housing markets, but which are either less objective, or less
widely available than LTV ratios or household debt. For example, demographic variables
such as the slope of the age-tenure profile can also be indicative of financial constraints. If
households can become homeowners at a relatively young age, this can also be an
indication of lax constraints. Other candidates are interest rate ceilings and maximum
maturity on mortgages, and costs of enforcing contracts and disposing of collateral.
                                                
14 See Japelli and Pagano (1994) for a discussion. As they argue, maximum LTV ratios are not always easy to
measure. In some countries, for example, payment arrangements are at the discretion of the individual lender,
with no statutory maximum LTV ratios. In other countries, regulatory ceilings differ across classes of
mortgages.
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Furthermore, there are variables such as bank lending practices, which are widely
mentioned in the literature, but which are of a nearly subjective nature.
Variables such as these have been widely used in the literature to discuss housing
finance in different countries. Table 3 incorporates this information in the following way. If
the literature about housing finance characterizes a particular country as being one where
there are substantial constraints to mortgage financing, we assign this particular country
with a value of zero in the fourth column. If there is clear evidence that a country is
characterized by a slight degree of financial constraints, we assign it a value of one. Again,
the appendix describes our sources in detail. We call this variable “literature dummy”.
The final variable we report in table 3 is a ranking of countries according to the
“level of housing finance”, which is reported by Borio (1996). The author examines in
detail the characteristics of credit to the non-government sector in different OECD
countries, and explicitly ranks the countries in a scale of one to four, where four is assigned
to countries with highest level of housing finance. We rescale his index to be between zero
and one, and group together the average values into 0.5.
As mentioned above, our other measures can be used as a verification of the
usefulness of the LTV ratio as a measure of financial constraints on households. Table 4
displays the correlation matrix for the variables in table 3. All the different measures of
financial constraints are highly positively correlated. For example, the correlation between
LTV ratios and out literature dummy is 0.71. This shows that the other variables that
authors use to characterize housing finance markets in the literature are consistent with the
information in LTV ratios. Similarly, the high correlation between LTV ratios and
household debt (0.79), shows that household debt is strongly affected by limitations on the
supply of credit, and is not only demand driven. All the correlations reported below are
strongly statistically significant, so we do not report p-values.
This seems to indicate that our data on LTV ratios does a good job of describing
international differences in mortgage finance markets, from the perspective of financial
constraints on households. We will use the LTV ratios in our empirical analysis as an
objective measure of the availability of finance to households in the different countries.
Finally, the last column in table 3 makes an attempt to summarize all the
information we collected in an index of the development of housing finance. Except for the
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LTV ratios, all the other columns are relative rankings across countries. We transform the
LTV column in a relative ranking between zero and one, and then average across the four
columns. This gives us an index of housing finance development. This index should be seen
only as a relative comparison across countries. For example, a value of 0.04 for Italy does
not mean that Italians can get no mortgage financing, but only that there is a lot of evidence
that Italy can be ranked among the countries in our sample where there are clear constraints
to mortgage financing.
In our empirical analysis, we will also use this index as an alternative measure of
housing finance development. Its somewhat subjective nature is the housing market
counterpart to the classification scheme designed by Kaplan and Zingales in their 1997
paper about financial constraints on firms. To the extent that our results hold both with the
LTV ratios and with the housing finance index, our results are strengthened.
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5 Empirical Results
Our goal is to test the hypothesis that house prices are more sensitive to income
shocks, in countries where housing finance is more developed. We start by doing this in the
simplest possible way, and then we refine our empirical approach.
5.1 Financial constraints and the sensitivity to current income
In table 5, we report the results of the following regressions. We regress the annual
change in the log of real house prices at country i (dPt,i), on current log changes in per-
capita GDP (dYt), and an interaction term dYt,i*FDi , where FDi  is our measure of financial
development in country i. We allow for time and country fixed effects (not reported).
The first column reports the result of a simple regression of house prices on changes
in income. The elasticity of prices with respect to contemporaneous income is 0.99, in this
simple regression15.
The results in the last two columns suggest that the development of housing finance
does change the sensitivity of house prices with respect to changes in current income, in the
direction predicted by the model in section 2. The coefficients on the interaction terms are
positive and strongly significant. This is true both when we use the housing finance index
(column 2), and when we use the LTV ratio (column 3) as a measure of financial
development. The implied economic magnitude of financial development is also large. If
we take a country where the maximum LTV ratio is 0.85 (such as the US), the implied
sensitivity of house prices to income is around 1.7. For a country with maximum LTV
equal to 0.5 (such as Italy), the implied sensitivity is only around 0.5.
These results are suggestive, but from an empirical perspective it is desirable to
consider more fully specified models of house price behavior. For example, there is plenty
of evidence that there is a consistent autoregressive pattern in house prices. There is
positive autocorrelation at short lags, but negative serial correlation at longer lags16. This
                                                
15 This value is well in line with the coefficient of 0.8 obtained for the US data, in Lamont and Stein (1999).
16 See for example Case and Shiller (1989), and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991).
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pattern has been shown to hold in international data as well17. We should also consider the
possibility that other variables such as interest rates are important forces driving house
price behavior. To the extent that the sensitivity of house prices to income still depends on
financial development in the context of a more complex empirical model, our result is
strengthened.
There are other advantages in considering a fully specified dynamic empirical
model as well. It allows us to evaluate the impact of financial development on house price
dynamics. And given the concerns about the quality of some of our house price indices, this
will allow us to evaluate the properties of our data in the context of the literature on house
price dynamics.
5.2 Benchmark model of house price dynamics
Tables 6 reports our search for an appropriate empirical model to fit our data. We
drop the interaction terms associated with financial development for the moment.
Column 1 of table 6 reports the estimation results associated with the model proposed by
Lamont and Stein (1999), in their study of house price dynamics in US cities. They regress
annual log house price changes (dPt) on current log changes in per-capita GDP (dYt), once-
lagged log house price changes (dPt-1), and on the start of period ratio of price to per-capita
income (Pt-1 /Yt-1), plus fixed effects. Lamont and Stein show that the parsimonious
specification in column 1 captures well the effects of longer price lags, and also of lagged
changes in per-capita GDP.
 It turns out that our results mirror precisely these results obtained for the US data, as
described in table 6. Lamont and Stein’s model (column 1) also describes our data
reasonably well. Adding further price and income lags cannot improve the fit substantially,
and these further lags are not statistically significant in the presence of the three variables in
column 1 (see column 2). These extra lags can become important if we take away the ratio
between house prices and income, but the overall fit is worse (column 3), indicating that
Pt-1 /Yt-1 indeed captures well the effects of longer lags. Finally, the results on column 4
(with no lagged price data) indicate that at least some autoregressive pattern in house price
                                                
17 See Englund and Ioannides (1997).
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dynamics is essential to describe the data well. As in Lamont and Stein, we can clearly take
the specification on column 1 as our benchmark specification. This has the added advantage
of allowing us to compare our coefficients to theirs.
Our coefficients on column 1 have similar values to those obtained in Lamont and
Stein18. The main difference is the higher elasticity of house prices to income in the
international data (0.7 versus 0.36). All our coefficients are strongly significant (with robust
standard errors), and the t-statistics are similar as well. This is particularly important, given
our initial concerns about the quality of our house price indices. Even though the overall fit
of the model is worse than in the US data (R2 of 0.5, versus 0.75 in Lamont and Stein), the
international data is good enough to generate coefficients that are as reliable as in the US
data. In particular, the international data also show the "momentum effect" (house prices
tend to go up tomorrow if they go up today), and long term reversal (the negative
coefficient on Pt-1/Yt-1)19.
5.3 Financial constraints and house price dynamics
We will now reintroduce our interaction term to the benchmark specification
(specification in column 1) described above. Again, the question we are asking is whether
house prices are more sensitive to changes in current income, in countries with high
financial development.
The results are reported in table 7. The interaction term is positive, and statistically
significant, both for LTV ratios and for the index of financial development.
We also report the results which obtain when we use interaction coefficients for all
variables in our benchmark specification (columns 3 and 4). This allows all the coefficients
in our benchmark specification to differ according to the level of financial development.
Notice that the current sensitivity of house prices to changes in income is still higher in
countries with higher financial development.
                                                
18 The coefficients on dPt-1 and Pt-1/Yt-1 are remarkably close to each other. Lamont and Stein obtain values
of 0.495 and -0.195 for these coefficients.
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The coefficients on the other variables (lagged price changes and price to income
ratio) are free to vary in this specification of the test. However, they are not significantly
different from each other in the two sets of regressions. The effect of financial constraints is
clearly on the sensitivity of house prices to changes in income20.
In order to give a visual illustration of the the economic significance of the effect of
financial development, we simulate the impact of a 1% shock to GDP percapita using the
coefficients in table 7, column 4. We take two hypothetical countries, one with maximum
LTV equal to 0.85 (like the US), and the other with maximum LTV to 0.5 (such as Italy).
Figure 2 shows the cumulative house price changes in these two countries. The result we
are emphasizing is evident to the eye. The sensitivity of prices to the income shock is
considerably higher in the country with high financial development. Prices increase rapidly
in such a country, with cumulative price change reaching 1.75% after 3 years. By
comparison, a country with low financial development displays a slower and more subdued
price response.
5.4 Explaining the individual coefficients
An alternative approach to the one we used in the previous sub-section is to test for
the effect of financial development using a two-stage procedure. First, we run a regression
for each country, using our benchmark specification (column 1, table 6). Then, we run a
cross-section regression where we try to explain the pattern found in the sensitivity of price
changes to income changes. This has the advantage of allowing for different dynamics for
each country in the sample, but our power to identify an effect of financial development
decreases.
                                                                                                                                                    
19 In a previous version, we also included changes in the real interest rate among the variables which
determine house price behavior, but the results were not very strong. The contemporaneous correlation
between changes in real rates and changes in house prices is negative (after controlling for further lags), but it
is not significant. Also, neither the first nor the second lags appear to be significant for the overall data.
20 The disadvantage associated with this specification is that, including Pt-1 /Yt-1 among the regressors is only
valid under the assumption that there is a constant long run price-to-income ratio (the country fixed effects
allow for long run price-to-income ratios to vary across countries, and the time effects allow for general world
trends in price-to-income ratios). However, we get the same results in the specification with lags of income
changes and one more lag of price changes (column 3 of table 6). These results are nor reported, but are
available from the author.
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Table 8 shows the estimated sensitivities of prices to current income, for each
country in the sample. It also displays data on accounting standards (see section 6.1 ahead)
and our data on per capita income in constant international prices, which we use as control
variables in the second stage regression21. The rationale behind this control is as follows.
It could be the case that high income countries have higher price-income elasticities,
simply because house markets are more liquid in such countries, and not because of
financing differences. Also, it could be that house price indices are better measured in high
income countries, and since income is correlated with financial development, our result
could be driven only by measurement error and attenuation bias22.
Tables 9 and 10 show our results. Overall, the same pattern shown in the previous
section emerges. Countries with high financial development tend to have higher price-
income elasticities, even after controlling for income and home ownership. This is
evidenced by the positive coefficients on the rows associated with HFD and LTV. Also, the
effects of income and home ownership are not very important, even before controlling for
financial development. In particular, after adjusting for financial development, the effect of
income appears to be negative. Therefore, there is little support for the alternative
explanations in our data. Financial development seems to be the most important variable to
explain the pattern in price-income elasticities23.
This pattern is also clear in figure 3, which shows graphically the pattern of
coefficients and LTV ratios. Figure 3 also makes it clear that there are some outliers in our
sample. Clearly, Japan (particularly) and Italy have estimated coefficients (3.72% and -
1.74% respectively), which are out of line with the rest of the sample. After we remove
these outliers from the regression, the conclusions above are considerably strengthened, as
shown in table 10. The effect of financial development is positive, large and significant
both for HFD and LTV, income has a negative effect after controlling for financial
development. This result is specially suggestive, given the loss in power associated with
this specification, as compared to the specification in the previous section.
                                                
21 Per-capita income is the average from 1970 to 1990 measured in constant international prices, from the
Barro and Lee (1994) data set.
22 Indeed, the correlation between income and the housing finance index is around 0.70 in our data.
23 Some coefficients are not significant in table 14, but this seems to be caused by some influential outliers, as
shown in the following table.
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5.5 Testing for non-linear effects
The empirical results above suggest that financial development increases the
sensitivity of prices to income. This is also a robust implication of the model in section 2
(proposition 2). Another implication of the model is that this sensitivity should be higher if
financial constraints are binding, than if financial constraints do not bind. If the degree of
financial development is so high that households become financially unconstrained, then
the sensitivity of prices to income should decrease. This could generate a non-monotonicity
on the relationship between financial development and the price-income elasticity.
Naturally, this will only occur if financial constraints become irrelevant for
countries with very well developed housing finance. Although we do not believe this is the
case for the different countries we consider we can try to accommodate these
considerations by looking for non-linear effects of financial development24. This is what we
do in tables 11 and 12. In table 11, we run separate regressions for the top, bottom and
middle one-third of the observations, sorted by financial development. The difference in
sensitivities from the top to the middle third of the sample tends to be positive, and higher
than the difference from the middle to the bottom third. Thus, there is no evidence for non-
monotonicity in the data.
This result is confirmed in table 12. We do the two-stage approach of the previous
sub-section, introducing the square of the measure of financial development as a regressor.
This should allow us to capture any non-linearities present in the data. Column (1) seems to
identify non-monotonicities, given the negative coefficient on the square term. However,
this result is driven solely by the outliers Japan and Italy. After we remove them from the
sample, the coefficient on the square term becomes positive.
5.6 Robustness Checks
Table 2 shows that our data is characterized by some very extreme values for house
price and GDP changes. In the first two columns of table 13 we report what happens if we
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eliminate these outliers. We sort the observations on both dYt and dPt, eliminate the 1% top
and bottom realizations, and repeat our exercise of table 7 (interaction specification).
It is clear from the estimated coefficients that our result is not driven by some
influential outliers. The coefficients on the interaction variable are positive, and of higher
magnitudes than in table 7. Furthermore, statistical significance (as measured by robust p-
values) increases.
One specific concern that we raised before was with the quality of some of our
house price indices. Two typical problems are that some indices are known not to be
representative of the whole country (Chile, France, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan),
while other indices are not really residential property indices (Greece and Portugal, which
are construction indices, and Japan, which is a land price index). There are some other
indices for which we have no reliable information about these characteristics (Austria).
These problems could lead to measurement error in house prices, which could bias our
coefficients.
Here, we address these possible criticisms by dropping all the countries cited above
from the analysis. The results are reported in table 13, columns 3 and 4. Our results survive
this important robustness check, despite the loss in statistical power. The magnitudes are
very similar to those in table 7, and still significant.
                                                                                                                                                    
24 Even for a country like the US, which has very well developed housing finance, previous work has shown
that down payment requirements can act as substantial constraints on household behavior. See Linneman and
Wachter (1989), and Lamont and Stein (1999).
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6 Are the results driven by financial development ?
Our major claim in this paper is that the behavior of house prices depends crucially
on the level of financial development across the world. This is evidence that financial
constraints on households matter. Furthermore, house prices are more sensitive to income
shocks in countries with more developed housing finance. This is evidence that less
financial constraints can lead to higher fluctuations in investment and prices.
We believe that our index of housing finance development captures well the extent
to which households are financially constrained in different countries of the world. One
potential problem with this argument is that our index of financial development reflects
observed measures of leverage. We use data on household debt to construct our index.
Some of the LTV data refers to regulatory constraints on mortgages, but for some countries
the data on maximum LTV ratios are constructed from observed values.
This may raise a concern that our index is not a precise measure of the availability
of finance to households. Perhaps household debt is low because households choose not to
borrow (the usual identification problem)25. More importantly, high leverage has been used
in the literature as an indication of tighter financial constraints26.
We try to address these potential criticisms by instrumenting our measure of
housing finance development with an alternative measure of financial development, which
is not directly related to leverage.
More specifically, we use the index of accounting standards computed by the Center
for International Financial Analysis and Research27. The idea is that, the higher the
standards of financial disclosure in a country, the easier it is for firms to raise funds from a
wide circle of investors. We use the data on accounting standards from LaPorta et al
(1998), as an instrument for the housing finance variables. Under the assumption that
                                                
25 Japelli and Pagano (1989) do address this identification problem directly, and conclude that differences in
observed debt reflect mostly the extent to which households are liquidity constrained.
26 Nevertheless, this is not the case in the consumption and savings literature. For example, Japelli and Pagano
(1989, 1994) use high LTV ratios and high consumer debt as evidence of higher availability of credit.
27 Accounting standards have been used as a measure of financial development in Rajan and Zingales (1998),
for example.
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similar variables influence the availability of finance to firms and households, accounting
standards is an appropriate instrument. Furthermore, it is not subject to the same criticisms
as an index which reflects leverage directly.
Our empirical results for the interactive specification are reported in table 14. It is
clear that our main result is robust to this important variation in specification. The
coefficient on the interaction terms dYt,i*FDi  is always positive and significant, both when
we use the (instrumented) housing finance index,  and the (instrumented) LTV ratio as a
measure of housing finance development. Indeed, the results are even stronger than the
previous result without the instrument, in terms of t statistics.
Table 15 shows the results for the alternative two-stage specification (eliminating
the outliers). Again, the results indicate that endogeneity of leverage is not an issue here.
We see this as strong indication that it is indeed the availability of finance in a
country which drives the cross-country differences in the sensitivity of prices to income.
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7 Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we show substantial empirical evidence that house prices are more
sensitive to shocks to per-capita income, in countries where housing finance is more
developed. This result is consistent with the theoretical framework developed in section 2,
where we study the impact of progressive relaxation of financial constraints on housing
demand and equilibrium house prices. Our results are also consistent with recent literature
on financial constraints and business investment (Almeida, 2000, Cleary, 1999 and Kaplan
and Zingales, 1997 and 1999), which argues that the investment of less constrained firms
can be more sensitive to changes in cash flow.
More broadly, our results challenge the traditional view that financial development
should lead to smaller fluctuations in key economic variables. From a policy perspective,
our results suggest that even if financial development has other economic benefits, it is
desirable to devise policies to minimize the potential side effects on the extent of
fluctuations.
There are some important extensions to the current work, both empirical and
theoretical.
Our empirical results show that financial development increases the sensitivity of
prices to income. This is also a robust implication of the model in section 2. However, we
cannot conclude from the analysis that financial constraints amplify sensitivities, in relation
to an unconstrained economy. The problem is that we cannot identify the unconstrained
price-income elasticity with our empirical approach, specially since we found no evidence
for non-monotonicities in section 5.5. The magnitude of the estimated impacts of a 1%
change in income (see figures 3 and 4) strongly suggest that there are amplification
mechanisms at work in our data, but this is no final proof.
One way to tackle this problem is to find a variable which is correlated with
household net worth, but which does not increase the unconstrained demand for houses. In
this case, we know that the sensitivity of prices to income in an unconstrained economy is
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zero, and we can attribute all the estimated sensitivities to financial constraints28. This is an
open question for future research.
The model in section 2 equates housing finance development to a decrease in down-
payment requirements (or an increase in LTV ratios). Although this seems to be consistent
with the data, it is a one-sided view of financial development, even when we consider only
the household sector.  There are other theoretical effects of financial development which
can affect the ability of households to finance their housing expenditures, and the ability to
hedge against income fluctuations. The model assumes that the only way a household can
raise credit is by pledging the house as collateral. One possible effect of financial
development is to improve the chances that households raise uncollateralized debt (such as
credit card debt)29. This can potentially revert the result that financial development
increases the sensitivity of prices to income. A similar effect would probably arise if
financial development also meant a better ability to hedge against income fluctuations. It
would be interesting to extend the model in section 2 to accommodate these considerations.
One important caveat is that neither the model in section 2 (like Stein, 1995) nor
Almeida, 2000 is a fully dynamic model. Therefore, some of the empirical analysis in
sections 5 and 6 is not fully grounded in theory. An important extension is to consider the
impacts of financial development in a fully dynamic model of the housing market which
allows for the impact of credit constraints (perhaps along the lines of Ortalo-Magne and
Rady, 1998, 1999).
                                                
28 The investment literature uses variations in cash flow which are not explained by variations in Tobin’s Q as
such an instrument. If we can find an empirical counterpart to Tobin’s Q in the housing market, this approach
can be implement to our data as well.
29 In terms of the model in section 2, this implies that households can raise debt in period 1 against future
income W2.
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Appendix
Data Description
Our house price indices were constructed from various sources. Most of the data for
developed countries were supplied by Peter Englund. It is the same data used in Englund
and Ioannides (1997). Below we refer to this source as “EIO”. We updated their data set
using the Annual Reports from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). We list all the
specific sources for each country, and the information we have about the respective indices.
Australia. EIO, and BIS. Weighted average index of prices for all capital cities and other
areas; obtained from quarterly national census of home loan approvals, available annually.
Austria. Maclennan, Muellbauer and Stephens (1998). Index apparently based on existing
houses, from the European Mortgage Federation (EMF).
Belgium. EIO, and BIS. Index based on annual transactions reports on small and medium
sized dwellings from entire country, with outliers excluded, available annually.
Canada. EIO, and BIS. Average annual transaction prices reported by multiple listing
services for entire country, covering 70% of all transactions.
Chile. Data provided by Felipe Morande, from Morande, F. and R.Soto (1992) updated by
R. Soto. Based on standardized dwellings in the area of Santiago, annual average.
Denmark. EIO, and BIS. Average value of single-family houses, including only arms’
length sales, available annually.
Finland. EIO and BIS. Average price per apartment and terraced houses, obtained per
square meter, as recorded by realtors (including 30% of all transactions), weighted by
region, available quarterly.
France. EIO and BIS. Index based on BIS own estimate, based on annual values for the
Paris region, adjusted by four-year survey for entire country.
Germany. EIO and BIS. Transaction prices per square meter, obtained from realtors for the
four largest cities, available annually.
Greece. Maclennan, Muellbauer and Stephens (1998). Construction index, from the EMF.
Hong Kong. From Chou and Shih (1995). Yearly change in the property price index, not
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quality adjusted.
Ireland. EIO and BIS. Average transactions price for existing homes, based on all loan
approvals, available annually.
Israel. Property price index representative of the entire country, from the Social Sciences
Data Archive.
Italy. EIO and BIS. Average price for new and completely refurbished dwellings in large
and middle-sized cities and tourist areas, reported by realtors, available annually.
Japan. EIO and BIS. Based on a survey of prices per square meter of land transactions in
residentially zoned areas, appraised by realtors, conducted annually.
Korea. Data from Kim (1993). Real price index from the Korea Housing Bank.
Malaysia. Data provided by S. Malpezzi. Real housing price index, used in Malpezzi and
Mayo (1997a).
Netherlands. EIO and BIS. Weighted average sales price for existing single and multi-
family houses, reported by realtors, including 50-60% of all transactions, available
annually.
New Zealand. Data from O'Donovan and Rae (1997). Valuation New Zealand house price
series. Average prices of free-hold house sales, adjusted for quality.
Norway. EIO and BIS. Average sales price of existing homes, weighted by type of
dwelling, reported by Property Owner’s Association, covering about 50% of all
transactions.
Portugal. Maclennan, Muellbauer and Stephens (1998). Construction index, from the EMF.
Singapore. Data from Phang and Wong (1997). Value weighted average of current prices
of five types of property in five planning districts. Excludes public housing.
Spain. Data provided by O. Bover. Prices per square meter of new dwellings in Madrid,
used in Bover (1993).
Sweden. EIO and BIS. Index based on owner-occupied one- and two-dwelling buildings,
based on reports of title registrations for arm’s length transactions, weighted by type of
dwelling, available annually.
Switzerland. Data from Hoesli, Giacotto and Favarger (1997). Repeat sales index for
condominiums in Geneva.
Taiwan. Data from Chang and Lai (1993). Change of house prices in Taipei.
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Thailand. Data provided by S. Malpezzi. Real housing price index, used in Malpezzi and
Mayo (1997a).
UK. EIO and BIS. Index based on survey of all dwellings with building societies
mortgages, weighted by type of dwelling, available annually.
US. EIO and BIS. Index based on sales price of existing single-family homes, based on
realtor reports, adjusted by regional availability of single-family homes and homeowner
mobility, available annually.
Construction of the Index of Household Indebtedness
Our starting point to construct the index in the second column of table 3 is the table
below, constructed from various sources. If a country is systematically ranked in the two
top quartiles in the different studies in the table below, it is assigned a value equal to one in
table 3. This is true of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK and US. If a country is systematically ranked in the middle quartiles, it is
assigned a value of 0.5 in table 3. This is the case of Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland,
Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. If a country is systematically ranked in the bottom
quartiles, it is assigned a value of zero (Korea, Italy and Greece). An eye examination of
the table below makes it clear that our classification is not very controversial. If there are
doubts about how to classify a country, or if there is no data available, we assigned a “na”
to such a country.
All the data we used is listed on table A.1 below.
Construction of the Literature Dummy
We use verbal descriptions of the housing market in different countries to add
information to our indicators of the development of housing finance. Information for each
individual country is listed below. For the countries that are not listed below, we were not
able to find relevant discussions. These countries get a value “na” in table 3. If the evidence
below suggests that households are constrained, the literature dummy (LD) is set equal to
zero. If the literature strongly suggests that households do not face substantial financial
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constraints, we set our dummy variable to one.
Austria. Deutsch (97) discusses Austrian housing finance. According to the author, Austria
is a clear example of liquidity constraints generated by high down-payment rates. This
evidence is complemented by Deutsch and Tomman (1995), who describe mortgage
finance in Austria as characterized by rather prudent lending practices. LD = 0.
France. Holmans (1994) gives data on moving owners and age/tenure relationships in
France. In France, the slope of the age/tenure profile is high; indicating that people may
have to wait more in order to be able to buy house. Also the percentage of moving owners
is smaller than in the UK and the US.  Japelli and Pagano (1994) mention that the costs of
enforcing contracts and disposing of collateral exceed 10% in Greece, Belgium, Spain,
France, Italy, Portugal (EMF, 1990) while they are just around 5% in the rest of the
European community. Finally, Miles (1994) classifies France households as being “credit
rationed to a limited extent”.  LD = 0.
Germany. Deutsch and Tomman (1995) describe mortgage finance in Germany as
characterized by rather prudent lending practices. Holmans (1994) gives data on moving
owners and age/tenure relationships in Germany. The slope of the age/tenure profile is
high, indicating that people may have to wait more in order to be able to buy house. Also
the percentage of moving owners is smaller than in the UK and the US.
Muellbauer, J. (1992) compares the German and the British housing finance systems,
concluding that gearing is certainly, on average, lower in Germany than in the UK. Mulder
and Wagner (1998) compare Germany to the Netherlands. In Netherlands, the transition to
home ownership is more concentrated at young ages. The author sees this as evidence that
Germans need more time to save in order to buy house. Finally, Miles (1994) classifies
German households as credit rationed to a limited extent. LD = 0.
Greece. Pirounakis (1997) gives relevant data on the Greek housing market. There are
69.5% of owner-occupiers in Greece, in 1981, but only 9% of those are repaying
mortgages. According to the author, housing credit is very small. Boleat (1985)
characterizes Greece as having an underdeveloped housing finance system. LD = 0.
Israel. Bar Nathan, Beenstock and Haitovsky (1998) describe housing finance in Israel.
According to them, no well-developed mortgage market exists. Housing is largely financed
out of own resources, and it is common that parents help their children to finance house
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purchases. LD = 0.
Italy. Guiso, L. T. Japelli and D. Terlizzese (1994) present evidence suggesting that
mortgage market imperfections are the most important factor in explaining the shape of the
Italian tenure-age profile. In Italy, home ownership ratio increases slowly with age, peaking
just before retirement, while in the US and UK, the profile peaks much earlier. Besides the
high down payment requirements that we document in table 3, interest rate spreads are high
and maturities are low. Also, there are substantial costs of enforcing contracts and
disposing of collateral. Miles (1994) classifies Italian households as credit rationed to a
limited extent. LD = 0.
Japan. Lomax (1994) suggests that, in general, mortgages remain rationed to a much
greater extent in continental Europe and Japan, as compared to the UK and US. Miles
(1994) also mentions that people are able to borrow more, and for longer, in the US and UK
than in Japan or continental Europe. Finally, Miles (1994) classifies Japan as credit rationed
to a limited extent. LD = 0.
Korea. According to Kim (1993), there is no significant formal housing finance in Korea.
Hannah, Kim and Malpezzi (1993) basically agree with Kim (93), and Green, Malpezzi and
Vandell (1994) mention that few Korean homeowners obtain significant debt financing,
with most having 100% equity or close to it. LD = 0.
Netherlands. Mulder and Wagner (1998) compare Netherlands to Germany, and generally
describe the Dutch housing finance system as very efficient and free of down payment and
other constraints. LD = 1.
New Zealand. Boleat (1985) analyzes housing finance in New Zealand. Generally, there is
a shortage of mortgage finance. A two-year period of savings is essential to secure a
mortgage, and down payment is at least 20%. For its standard of living, New Zealand still
has a fairly primitive housing finance system. High LTV loans are generally not available.
LD = 0.
Portugal. Boleat (1985) characterizes Portugal’s housing finance as typical of an
underdeveloped economy. The financial system in general is not well developed, with a
considerable amount of activity outside the main institutional framework.
Japelli and Pagano (1994) mention the high costs of enforcing contracts and disposing of
collateral in Portugal. LD = 0.
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Switzerland. Boleat (1985) describes the Swiss housing finance system as one of the most
efficient in the world. For example, there is considerable evidence that mortgage debt, as a
percentage of GDP is highest in Switzerland. LD = 1.
Taiwan. Chang and Lai (1993) say that In Taiwan, the institutional environment for real
estate finance is not well established. There is a lack of well developed financial
institutions. LD = 0.
Thailand. Boleat (1985) mentions that in Thailand, the main source of housing finance are
friends and relatives. Housing lending is a very small percentage of total bank lending. LD
= 0.
UK. The UK is usually used in the literature as an example of a country with little
restrictions on household finance. Besides all the evidence described above, Miles (1994)
classifies the UK as having a slight extent of credit rationing. LD = 1.
US. Similar to the UK. LD = 1.
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Table 1: Summary statistics, 29 countries, 1970-1998
Variable Description Obs Mean  Standard
Deviation
Max Min
dP Change in log real house price 651 0.019     0.099 -0.608 0.664
dY Change in log real percapita
GDP
758 0.028     0.038 -0.264 0.365
Sources: IMF international financial statistics (IFS), for GDP, population and inflation data. For the
sources of the house price data, see the appendix.
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Table 2. Summary of house price data per country, 1970-1998
Annual change in log real house prices
Country Obs Mean Standard
Deviation
Max Min
Australia 28 0.009 0.071 -0.123 0.253
Austria 7 0.042 0.016 0.016 0.061
Belgium 28 0.016 0.062 -0.115 0.138
Canada 28 0.014 0.070 -0.177 0.139
Chile 23 0.025 0.190 -0.608 0.249
Denmark 28 0.009 0.084 -0.162 0.128
Finland 28 0.007 0.106 -0.214 0.261
France 28 0.010 0.058 -0.101 0.210
Germany 27 0.003 0.087 -0.135 0.224
Greece 8 0.000 0.032 -0.058 0.030
Hong Kong 12 0.042 0.184 -0.257 0.376
Ireland 28 0.021 0.070 -0.136 0.180
Israel 27 0.024 0.082 -0.113 0.226
Italy 22 0.007 0.106 -0.149 0.293
Japan 28 0.013 0.111 -0.313 0.242
Korea 16 0.059 0.073 -0.052 0.171
Malaysia 14 0.059 0.105 -0.136 0.253
Netherlands 28 0.022 0.093 -0.174 0.273
New Zealand 21 -0.002 0.070 -0.124 0.126
Norway 28 0.016 0.086 -0.182 0.179
Portugal 12 0.021 0.034 -0.020 0.080
Singapore 23 0.073 0.183 -0.302 0.453
Spain 22 0.021 0.118 -0.117 0.307
Sweden 28 -0.004 0.072 -0.163 0.113
Switzerland 22 0.004 0.072 -0.172 0.109
Taiwan 15 0.082 0.201 -0.105 0.664
Thailand 16 -0.001 0.012 -0.025 0.018
UK 28 0.022 0.111 -0.145 0.322
United States 28 0.015 0.031 -0.049 0.074
Total 651 0.019 0.099 -0.608 0.664
Sources: See the appendix.
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Table 3. Indicators of development of the housing finance market
Country LTV
ratio
Household debt;
1=high or
average to high.
0.5 = average
0 = low
Borio Ranking;
1= high
0.5 = average
0 = low
Literature
dummy; = 0 if
credit
constrained
Index of
Housing
Finance
Development
Australia 0.78 1 1 na 0.87
Austria 0.68 0.5 0.5 0 0.34
Belgium 0.70 0.5 1 na 0.63
Canada 0.80 1 1 na 0.89
Chile na na na na na
Denmark 0.90 1 na na 0.98
Finland 0.83 1 na na 0.88
France 0.80 0.5 0.5 0 0.42
Germany 0.73 1 0.5 0 0.50
Greece 0.50 0 na 0 0.03
Hong Kong na na na na na
Ireland 0.85 0.5 na na 0.69
Italy 0.53 0 0 0 0.04
Israel 0.50 na na 0 0.04
Japan 0.60 0.5 0 0 0.18
Korea 0.30 0 na 0 0.00
Malaysia 0.65 na na na 0.28
Netherlands 0.75 0.5 1 1 0.77
New Zealand 0.73 na na 0 0.26
Norway 0.78 1 na na 0.80
Portugal 0.60 0.5 na 0 0.23
Singapore 0.85 na na na 0.88
Spain 0.70 0.5 0.5 na 0.47
Sweden 0.93 1 0.5 na 0.83
Switzerland na 1 1 1 1.00
Taiwan 0.40 na na 0 0.02
Thailand 0.65 na na 0 0.14
United
Kingdom 0.84 1 1 1 0.95
United States 0.85 1 1 1 0.96
Sources: LTV data is from Japelli and Pagano (1994), with the exception of Austria, Canada and
Singapore. Data refer to the maximum LTV ratio, averaged over the period 1971-1987. Austria
LTV data is from Deutsch (1997). Canada LTV data is from Guiso, Japelli and Terlizzese (1994).
Singapore LTV data is from Phang and Wong (1997). The Borio ranking is from Borio (1996). It
measures the share of total credit to the non-government sector that goes to households. The index
of household indebtedness is constructed from various different sources. See the appendix, specially
table A.1. The literature dummy is also constructed from various sources in the literature. See the
appendix for a discussion of each specific country. The index in the final column is an average of
the four previous columns (LTV ratio rescaled to be between 0 and 1).
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Table 4. Correlation matrix for the different indicators of housing finance
development
LTV
ratio
Household
indebtedness
index
Borio
ranking
LTV ratio 1.00
Household indebtedness
index
0.79 1.00
Borio ranking 0.59 0.62 1.00
Literature dummy 0.71 0.62 0.89
Sources: own calculations from several sources cited in the text.
47
Table 5. Results from univariate specification
All Data FD = HFD index FD = LTV ratio
dYt 0.99 0.33 -1.25
(2.91) (2.03) (-1.79)
dYt*FD 1.59 3.46
(3.23) (2.97)
No of Obs 641 606 584
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.32 0.32
The dependent variable is dPt, the change in log real house price in year t, in country j. dYt is the
change in GDP per-capita in country j, year t. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 6. Benchmark empirical model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dYt 0.704 0.710 0.866 1.002
(3.4) (3.3) (2.80) (3.24)
dPt-1 0.456 0.450 0.377
(6.95) (5.88) (3.72)
Pt-1 /Yt-1 -0.176 -0.190
(8.61) (7.88)
dYt-1 0.001 0.218 0.540
(0.01) (1.61) (3.37)
dYt-2 -0.124 0.075 0.128
(0.95) (0.55) (1.03)
dPt-2 0.061 -0.108
(0.926) (1.53)
No of Obs 612 583 583 604
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.49 0.39 0.31
The dependent variable is dPt, the change in log real house price in year t, in country j. dYt is the
change in GDP per-capita in country j, year t, and Pt-1 /Yt-1  is the ratio of house prices to income
per-capita.
All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 7. Interaction with financial development
FD = HFD index FD = LTV ratio FD = HFD index FD = LTV ratio
dYt 0.337 -0.426 0.341 -0.545
(2.92) (0.83) (3.27) (1.40)
dPt-1 0.481 0.485 0.556 0.72
(11.04) (10.8) (4.08) (1.83)
Pt-1 /Yt-1 -0.156 -0.159 -0.21 -0.386
(7.94) (7.49) (3.89) (2.73)
dYt*FD 0.885 1.71 0.935 1.955
(2.563) (1.96) (2.96) (2.74)
dPt-1*FD -0.129 -0.322
(0.72) (0.64)
(Pt-1 /Yt-1)*FD 0.089 0.305
(1.26) (1.71)
No of Obs 579 558 579 558
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52
The dependent variable is dPt, the change in log real house price in year t, in country j. dYt is the
change in GDP per-capita in country j, year t, and Pt-1 /Yt-1  is the ratio of house prices to income
per-capita.
All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 8. Separate regressions for each country
      Coefficient Account. Std.         Income
Australia 1.51 0.75 0.84
Austria 0.08 0.54 0.67
Belgium 0.88 0.65 0.71
Canada 1.25 0.74 0.92
Chile 2.78 0.52 0.23
Denmark 2.28 0.62 0.76
Finland 1.71 0.77 0.73
France 1.18 0.69 0.76
Germany 0.59 0.62 0.76
Greece 0.96 0.55 0.37
Hong Kong -0.39 0.69 0.57
Ireland 1.04 na 0.43
Italy -1.74 0.64 0.48
Israel 0.36 0.62 0.65
Japan 3.72 0.65 0.69
Korea 0.73 0.62 0.23
Malaysia 0.82 0.76 0.22
Netherlands 1.42 0.64 0.72
New Zealand -0.07 0.7 0.70
Norway 2.17 0.74 0.78
Portugal -0.50 0.36 0.32
Singapore 2.31 0.78 0.44
Spain 1.92 0.64 0.50
Sweden 1.24 0.83 0.82
Switzerland 0.29 0.68 0.96
Taiwan 1.11 0.65 0.32
Thailand -0.03 0.64 0.14
United Kingdom 1.92 0.78 0.67
United States 0.41 0.71 1.00
Coefficient is the coefficient on income change in the benchmark specification which includes
lagged price changes and last period ratio of prices to income. Income is the 1970-1990 average
GDP percapita measured in constant international prices, from Barro and Lee (1994). The data on
accounting standards from LaPorta et al (1998).
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Table 9. Explaining the individual coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HFD 1.176 1.391
(2.17) (1.84)
LTV 1.273 1.095
(1.92) (1.31)
Income 0.510 -0.477 0.403
(0.574) (0.414) (0.36)
Obs 27 26 29 27 26
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.10 -0.02 0.09 0.06
The dependent variable is the coefficient on income change in the benchmark specification which
includes lagged price changes and last period ratio of prices to income, for each country. HFD is the
housing finance index (see table 3), and LTV the loan to value ratio. Income is the 1970-1990
average GDP percapita measured in constant international prices, from Barro and Lee (1994).
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Table 10. Explaining the individual coefficients (no Japan, no Italy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HFD 1.186 1.825
(3.08) (3.45)
LTV 1.327 1.479
(2.89) (2.49)
Income 0.155 -1.293 -0.319
(0.22) (1.69) (0.42)
Obs 25 24 27 25 25
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.24 -0.04 0.32 0.21
The dependent variable is the coefficient on income change in the benchmark specification which
includes lagged price changes and last period ratio of prices to income, for each country. HFD is the
housing finance index (see table 3), and LTV the loan to value ratio. Income is the 1970-1990
average GDP percapita measured in constant international prices, from Barro and Lee (1994). The
observations for Japan and Italy have been dropped from the regressions.
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Table 11. Testing for non-linear effects
FD = HFD index FD = LTV Ratio
High-Med Med-Low High-Med Med-Low
dYt 0.414 0.384 0.784 0.248
(1.03) (1.65) (2.18) (1.25)
dPt-1 -0.011 -0.062 -0.049 -0.081
(0.19) (0.43) (0.69) (0.61)
Pt-1 /Yt-1 -0.056 0.092 0.037 0.030
(1.50) (1.78) (1.19) (0.66)
No of Obs 411 406 384 378
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.49
The data are sorted based on the measure of financial development, and separate regressions are run
for the top, medium and bottom one-third of the observations (approximately). The dependent
variable is dPt, the change in log real house price in year t, in country j. dYt is the change in GDP
per-capita in country j, year t, and Pt-1 /Yt-1  is the ratio of house prices to income per-capita. All
regressions include country and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 12. Testing for non-linear effects with individual coefficients
All
sample
All
sample
No
outliers
No
outliers
HFD 2.003 0.589
(0.83) (0.35)
LTV 0.640 0.322
(0.25) (0.19)
HFD square -0.827 0.590
(0.35) (0.37)
LTV square 0.644 1.017
(0.25) (0.61)
Obs 27 26 25 24
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.06 0.23 0.22
The dependent variable is the coefficient on income change in the benchmark specification which
includes lagged price changes and last period ratio of prices to income, for each country. HFD is the
housing finance index (see table 3), and LTV the loan to value ratio. The observations for Japan and
Italy have been dropped from the regressions in columns (3) and (4).
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Table 13. Robustness Checks
No Outliers No Outliers Selected
Countries
Selected
Countries
FD = HFD index FD = LTV ratio FD = HFD index FD = LTV ratio
dYt 0.127 -0.816 0.181 -0.783
(0.408) (1.07) (1.31) (1.80)
dPt-1 0.418 0.416 0.433 0.445
(9.917) (9.89) (10.44) (10.74)
Pt-1 /Yt-1 -0.119 -0.122 -0.145 -0.152
(6.00) (5.68) (7.108) (7.19)
dYt*FD 1.355 2.434 1.264 2.197
(2.89) (2.35) (3.74) (2.79)
No of Obs 562 542 448 448
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.51
The top and bottom 1% of the observations sorted on dPt  and dYt  were discarded in the first two
columns.
All the observations for Austria, Chile, France, Greece, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and
Taiwan were eliminated from the regressions in the last two columns.
The dependent variable is dPt, the change in log real house price in year t, in country j. dYt is the
change in GDP per-capita in country j, year t, and Pt-1 /Yt-1  is the ratio of house prices to income
per-capita.
All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 14. Instrumenting housing finance with accounting standards
FD = HFD index FD = LTV ratio
dYt 0.136 -1.831
(0.684) (2.57)
dPt-1 0.474 0.470
(11.2) (10.9)
Pt-1 /Yt-1 -0.155 -0.156
(7.73) (7.34)
dYt*FD 1.640 4.107
(4.11) (3.81)
No of Obs 553 532
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51
The dependent variable is dPt, the change in log real house price in year t, in country j. dYt is the
change in GDP per-capita in country j, year t, and Pt-1 /Yt-1  is the ratio of house prices to income
per-capita.
The housing finance index and the LTV ratio are instrumented with accounting standards.
All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 15. Explaining the individual coefficients with instrument for
financial development (no Japan, no Italy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HFD 2.224 3.865
(2.70) (2.44)
LTV 2.455 3.531
(2.81) (2.36)
Income 0.155 -3.556 -2.164
(0.22) (1.94) (1.48)
Obs 24 23 27 24 23
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.10 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01
The dependent variable is the coefficient on income change in the benchmark specification which
includes lagged price changes and last period ratio of prices to income, for each country. HFD is the
housing finance index (see table 3), and LTV the loan to value ratio. Income is the 1970-1990
average GDP percapita measured in constant international prices, from Barro and Lee (1994). The
observations for Japan and Italy have been dropped from the regressions. The housing finance index
and the LTV ratio are instrumented with accounting standards.
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Table A.1. Indicators of household indebtedness
Japelli and
Pagano (1989)
Housing
Mortgage
Loans, as % of
total
consumption
Kim (93)
Housing
Loans
outstanding
as % of GNP
Boleat
(1985)
Mortgage
Debt as %
of
National
Income
Holmans
(1994)
House
purchase
debt as
% of
GDP
Guiso,
Japelli and
Terlizzese
(1994)
Mortgage
Debt as %
of GNP
Muellbauer
et al (1998)
Outstanding
residential
mortgage
debt as % of
GDP
Australia na na na na na Na
Austria na na na na na 30-33
Belgium na na na na na 22
Canada na na 36 na na Na
Chile na na na na na Na
Denmark na na na na na 65
Finland na na na na na 30
France na na 28 16 21 21
Germany na na 37 20 22 51
Greece 9.9 na na na na 6
H. Kong na na na na na na
Ireland na na na na na 27
Italy 7.8 na 6 na 7 7
Israel na na na na na na
Japan 32.7 32.9 15 na 25 na
Korea na 9.4 na na na na
Malaysia na na na na na na
Netherl. na na na na na 60
New Zeal. na na na na na na
Norway na na na na na na
Portugal na na na na na 26
Singapore na na na na na na
Spain 7.7 na na na na 22
Sweden 80.3 na na na na 57
Switz. na na 64 na na na
Taiwan na na na na na na
Thailand na na na na na na
UK 46.4 44.9 28 46 58 51
US 61.7 55.2 41 39 45 na
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Table A.1 continued
Borio (96)
Credit to
household
sector as %
of GDP,
1983
Borio (96)
Credit to
household
sector as %
of GDP,
1993
Miles(1994)
Stock of
Mortgage
Debt as % of
household
disposable
Income
Japelli and
Pagano (1994)
Household debt
for current and
durable
consumption as
% of NNP, 1970
Japelli and
Pagano (1994)
Household debt
for current and
durable
consumption as
% of NNP, 1980
Australia 43 52 na na 7.7
Austria 20 28 na na Na
Belgium 31 41 na 3.5 4.6
Canada 38 56 50 na Na
Chile na na na na Na
Denmark na na 66 16.1 14.9
Finland na na na 17.4 15
France 29 26 48 1.7 2.4
Germany 46 48 na 4.1 7.9
Greece na na na 0 0.1
H. Kong na na na na Na
Ireland na na na 6.1 8.6
Italy 17 10 7 2.4 2.5
Israel na na na na Na
Japan 21 32 38 5.9 7.4
Korea na na na na Na
Malaysia na na na na Na
Netherl. 41 49 na 2.1 4.1
New Zeal. na na na na Na
Norway na na na 13.3 13.7
Portugal na na na na 1.5
Singapore na na na na Na
Spain 12 25 10 na 4.9
Sweden na na na na 31.6
Switz. 78 91 64 na Na
Taiwan na na na na Na
Thailand na na na na na
UK 31 63 67 na 5.7
US 46 60 60 15.8 16.1
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Figure 1
Sensitivity of Prices to Income and Financial Development
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Figure 2
Cumulative Price Change
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Figure 3
Sensitivity of Prices to Income and Financial Development
Empirical Estimates
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